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AVOIDING STICKER SHOCK: LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO 
PROTECT CONSUMERS FROM SURPRISE MEDICAL BILLS 
ABSTRACT 
Consumers are increasingly receiving surprise medical bills, where an 
insured patient is unexpectedly billed directly for medical services received at 
an in-network health care facility from an out-of-network provider. These 
situations often arise in emergency rooms, operating rooms, and delivery rooms, 
despite the efforts of patients to receive care only from in-network providers. 
Surprise medical bills commonly leave consumers on the hook for thousands of 
dollars for out-of-network services that they had no opportunity to refuse. This 
article explores how the steady rise of narrow provider network health plans 
and the often-corresponding lack of transparency regarding which providers 
are included in the network has led to an increase in surprise medical bills. It 
then examines various legislative approaches at both the federal and state level 
to protect consumers from these unexpected bills. This article ultimately 
proposes a statutory framework based on a modified version of New York’s law 
that would effectively remove consumers from surprise medical bill disputes, 
leaving reimbursement arguments to health plans and providers. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Peter Drier was prepared.1 He had been anticipating this surgery for 
months. After presenting with excruciating pain in his upper back and numbness 
in his hand, a scan revealed that Mr. Drier had herniated disks in his back. He 
needed spinal fusion surgery. Mr. Drier did his homework, diligently 
researching his insurance plan to ensure the implants and surgical screws were 
covered and that his surgeon, anesthesiologist, orthopedist, and the hospital 
where the surgical procedure was scheduled were all either inside his provider 
network or willing to settle on a reimbursement rate with his health plan. Mr. 
Drier knew the procedure would be expensive, and he was prepared for the bills 
as they began to arrive. Despite his meticulous preparation, he was astounded 
when he received the $117,000 bill from an “assistant surgeon” whom he had 
never met. This surgeon, who happened to be the chief of neurosurgery at 
another hospital, had unexpectedly participated in Mr. Drier’s care without his 
knowledge, and Mr. Drier was sent the bill. A second pair of hands was 
apparently needed during Mr. Drier’s spinal fusion, which is usually provided 
by a hospital employee such as a resident, nurse, or physician assistant for no 
additional charge. When no such provider was available, the neurosurgeon came 
to help unexpectedly. Mr. Drier thought he had done everything he possibly 
could have to be informed and prepared. He expressed his feeling of 
helplessness, saying, “[T]his was just so wrong—I had no choice and no 
negotiating power.”2 
Mr. Drier is not alone. Consumers are increasingly receiving these 
“surprise” medical bills, where an insured patient is unexpectedly billed for care 
received at an in-network health care facility from an out-of-network provider.3 
According to a national survey, thirty percent of privately insured Americans 
received a surprise medical bill from 2013 to 2015.4 Many consumers receive 
surprise medical bills despite their due diligence in attempting to receive care 
only from in-network providers; one in seven insured Americans has been 
surprised to discover that a provider they thought was in-network was actually 
considered out-of-network.5 Consumer Reports, an independent, nonprofit 
 
 1. Elisabeth Rosenthal, After Surgery, Surprise $117,000 Medical Bill from Doctor He 
Didn’t Know, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/21/us/drive-by-doc 
toring-surprise-medical-bills.html (last visited July 24, 2017). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Elisabeth Ponsot & Daniel Moritz-Rabson, Americans Who Confronted ‘Surprise’ 
Medical Bills Share Their Stories, PBS NEWSHOUR (June 26, 2016, 2:53 PM), www.pbs.org/news 
hour/updates/americans-who-confronted-surprise-medical-bills-share-their-stories/ (last visited 
July 24, 2017). 
 4. CONSUMER REPORTS NAT’L RESEARCH CTR., SURPRISE MEDICAL BILLS SURVEY 8 
(2015), consumersunion.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/CY-2015-SURPRISE-MEDICAL-
BILLS-SURVEY-REPORT-PUBLIC.pdf. 
 5. Id. 
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organization that promotes the interests of consumers,6 has collected over 4000 
stories from consumers who have struggled to pay surprise medical bills.7 
The surprise bill itself usually involves two components. The first 
component “reflects the difference in patient cost-sharing between in-network 
and out-of-network providers.”8 The second component reflects balance billing, 
where the beneficiary is charged the difference between the plan’s negotiated, 
discounted fee it has agreed to pay for a given service with its in-network 
providers and the full fee the out-of-network provider charges for the service.9 
Surprise medical bills usually occur: (1) in an emergency situation when a 
patient has no control over the emergency room, treating physicians, or 
ambulance selected10 or (2) in a non-emergency situation when a patient plans 
to receive care from an in-network facility, but out-of-network providers 
unexpectedly participate in the patient’s care in either the inpatient context11 or 
the outpatient context.12 The first scenario occurs because, as the American 
 
 6. CONSUMER REPORTS, https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/about-us/index.htm (last 
visited July 23, 2017). 
 7. Donna Rosato, 5 Doctors Most Likely to Stick You with Surprise Medical Bills, CONSUMER 
REPORTS (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.consumerreports.org/medical-billing/5-doctors-likely-to-
stick-you-with-surprise-medical-bills/ (last visited July 23, 2017). 
 8. Karen Pollitz, Surprise Medical Bills, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 17, 2016), www.kff.org 
/private-insurance/issue-brief/surprise-medical-bills/ (last visited July 23, 2016). 
 9. Id.; see also U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Balance Billing, 
HEALTHCARE.GOV: GLOSSARY, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/balance-billing/ (last visited 
July 23, 2017). 
 10. Zack Cooper & Fiona Scott Morton, Out-of-Network Emergency-Physician Bills — An 
Unwelcome Surprise, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1915, 1916 (2016) (finding from a national data 
sample of 2.2 million emergency room visits, twenty-two percent of patients who went to in-
network emergency rooms were balance billed for care received from an out-of-network physician); 
see also, e.g., BENJAMIN LAWSKY, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., AN UNWELCOME SURPRISE: 
HOW NEW YORKERS ARE GETTING STUCK WITH UNEXPECTED MEDICAL BILLS FROM OUT-OF-
NETWORK PROVIDERS 19 (2012) (reporting that the average out-of-network emergency bill was 
$7,006, and while insurers paid an average of $3,228, consumers were left with a bill of “$3,778 
for an emergency in which they had no choice”). Consumers living in rural areas who require life-
saving air ambulance flights are increasingly facing extraordinary balance billing when their 
insurance companies do not have an in-network air ambulance company, leading to formal 
complaints to state auditors. Corin Cates-Carney, Insurers, Air Ambulance Companies Spar over 
Costs at Legislative Hearing, MONT. PUB. RADIO (Feb. 4, 2016), mtpr.org/post/insurers-air-
ambulance-companies-spar-over-costs-legislative-hearing (last visited July 23, 2017). 
 11. See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 1; see also Erin Taylor & Layla Parast, A Tale of Two 
Deliveries, or an Out-of-Network Problem, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 3, 2015), healthaffairs.org/ 
blog/2015/11/03/a-tale-of-two-deliveries-or-an-out-of-network-problem/ (last visited July 23, 
2017) (telling the story of two women with the same health insurance plan who gave birth on 
different days at the same in-network hospital, but only one was billed $1600 from an out-of-
network anesthesiologist who happened to be working that day). 
 12. See, e.g., Stephanie O’Neill, California Aims to Limit Surprise Medical Bills, NPR (Sept. 
11, 2016, 5:11 AM), www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/09/11/493233748/california-aims-to 
-limit-surprise-medical-bills (last visited July 23, 2017) (telling the story of a woman who received 
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Medical Association (AMA) reports, out of all major specialties, emergency 
medicine physicians are most likely to be independent contractors,13 meaning 
they are more likely to have out-of-network status even when working at an in-
network facility, and patients do not have the ability to refuse care or worry 
about the network status of their providers when in an emergency situation. One 
study reports that one in five hospitals that are in-network for the three largest 
health insurers by market share in Texas have zero in-network emergency room 
physicians,14 meaning all emergency services billed by these providers will be 
at the out-of-network rate. Although the Public Health Service Act requires that 
all non-grandfathered health plans only charge in-network cost sharing for 
emergency services provided by an out-of-network hospital,15 no federal 
legislation prohibits an out-of-network emergency room physician from balance 
billing the patient.16 The second scenario occurs because: (1) assistant 
physicians are pulled in unexpectedly to help the attending physician with a 
surgical procedure or for a consult, and (2) hospitals tend to “use physician 
outsourcing firms for anesthesiologists, emergency room physicians, 
hospitalists, pathologists and radiologists.”17 These physician specialties 
frequently do not participate in the same health plans as the hospital, meaning 
patients may strategically schedule procedures at an in-network hospital with an 
in-network attending physician but may still receive unexpected bills from out-
of-network providers that participated in their care.18 Patients are often in 
scenarios where verifying the network status of every assisting provider that 
walks in the room would be either unreasonable (such as a patient in the middle 
 
a mastectomy follow-up surgery from an in-network outpatient facility but unexpectedly received 
a $580 bill for an out-of-network anesthesiologist). 
 13. See CAROL K. KANE & DAVID W. EMMONS, AM. MED. ASS’N, POLICY RESEARCH 
PERSPECTIVES: NEW DATA ON PHYSICIAN PRACTICE ARRANGEMENTS: PRIVATE PRACTICE 
REMAINS STRONG DESPITE SHIFTS TOWARD HOSPITAL EMPLOYMENT 10 ex. 2 (2013), 
https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/premium/health-policy/prp-physician 
-practice-arrangements_0.pdf (American Medical Association 2012 Physician Practice Benchmark 
Survey). 
 14. STACEY POGUE & MEGAN RANDALL, CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY PRIORITIES, SURPRISE 
MEDICAL BILLS TAKE ADVANTAGE OF TEXANS: LITTLE-KNOWN PRACTICE CREATES A “SECOND 
EMERGENCY” FOR ER PATIENTS 4 (2014), forabettertexas.org/images/HC_2014_09_PP_Balance 
Billing.pdf. 
 15. Public Health Service Act § 2719A(b)(l)(C)(ii)(II), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19a (2012) (“[I]f 
[emergency] services are provided [to a participant, beneficiary, or enrollee] out-of-network, the 
cost-sharing requirement (expressed as a copayment amount or coinsurance rate) is the same 
requirement that would apply if such services were provided in-network . . . .”). 
 16. Pollitz, supra note 8. 
 17. Bob Herman, Billing Squeeze: Hospitals in Middle as Insurers and Doctors Battle over 
Out-of-Network Charges, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Aug. 29, 2015), www.modernhealthcare.com/arti 
cle/20150829/MAGAZINE/308299987 (last visited July 23, 2017). 
 18. Id. 
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of childbirth) or impossible (such as an anesthetized patient in the middle of a 
surgical procedure). 
In both scenarios, the health plan and out-of-network provider often enter a 
battle over the proper rate for services rendered, with the consumer usually on 
the losing end. At the heart of the dispute is who is financially responsible for 
costs associated with out-of-network care—the health plan could cover the entire 
out-of-network rate billed, the out-of-network provider could accept the health 
plan’s rate, or the consumer could pay the balance of the bill. Health plans and 
out-of-network providers are obstinately unwilling to negotiate with each other. 
UnitedHealthcare recently stated that it is “deeply concerned that some hospital-
based physicians are establishing out-of-network strategies to seek excessively 
high reimbursement levels, sometimes more than 10 times what an in-network 
physician would charge for the same service,” and accordingly announced that 
it was lowering how much it would reimburse out-of-network providers, 
exposing consumers to potentially larger balance bills.19 Insurance companies 
are concerned that physicians may strategically refuse to join a health plan 
network in order to later bill that health plan, as an out-of-network provider, at 
a rate higher than the contracted reimbursement rate.20 This strategy allows 
physicians to circumvent price competition and undermines a health plan’s 
ability to control costs and quality, which is the very basis of a network health 
plan as previously discussed. On the other side, out-of-network providers 
maintain that “the real crux of the problem is health insurers are refusing to pay 
fair market rates for the care and services provided . . . . It’s the insurer who 
refuses to negotiate in good faith and pay a fair rate.”21 With such polarized, but 
equally-stubborn, stances on medical billing rates, the consumer is left paying 
for the large difference in rates. Although the Department of Health and Human 
Services regulates the rate that insurers must pay out-of-network providers,22 
 
 19. Jordan Shapiro, Insurer’s Policy Change Could Leave Patients on the Hook for Bills, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 29, 2015), www.stltoday.com/business/local/insurer-s-policy-
change-could-leave-patients-on-the-hook/article_2573dc50-33e6-5840-ac8f-3abcef0b12cb.html 
(last visited July 23, 2017). 
 20. See id. 
 21. Harris Meyer, Vital Signs Blog: New AMA Leader Rejects Growing Movement to Regulate 
Out-of-Network Doc Bills, MOD. HEALTHCARE (June 14, 2015), www.modernhealthcare.com/arti 
cle/20150614/blog/150619956 (last visited July 23, 2017). 
 22. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 37,188, 37,194 (June 28, 2010) 
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 144, 146, 147) (requiring that insurers pay out-of-network providers 
the greatest of (i) the in-network rate for emergency services, (ii) a payment based on the methods 
the plan generally uses to determine payments for out-of-network services (such as the usual, 
customary, and reasonable amount), or (iii) the amount that Medicare would pay for the emergency 
services). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
184 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 11:179 
this does not prevent the provider from billing the patient the balance of the 
reimbursement requested and the reimbursement received from the insurer.23 
Section II explores why surprise medical billing has become more 
common—due to the increasing popularity and prevalence of narrow network 
health plans. As will be discussed, narrow networks are used by insurance 
companies as a strategy to lower premiums and exercise greater control over 
quality of care. However, as networks narrow, more providers are excluded from 
the network, which leads to surprise medical billing situations, as examined 
further. Section III describes federal law approaches to protecting consumers 
from surprise medical billing that ultimately fall short, including (1) the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (CMS’) network adequacy standard for 
Marketplace Qualified Health Plans (QHPs) and (2) the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners’ (NAIC’s) updated Health Benefit Plan Network 
Access and Adequacy Model Act (Model Act), which is meant to serve as model 
legislation for states to consider adopting. As this comment illustrates, states that 
have yet to adopt legislation addressing surprise balance billing ought to 
understand the shortcomings of these federal approaches and look to legislation 
that other states have implemented in order to determine which statutory 
framework best protects consumers. Section IV evaluates a spectrum of state 
laws aimed at protecting consumers from surprise medical bills. Statutes in 
Massachusetts, Texas, and New York are critically examined as examples of 
potential legislative approaches. Section V recommends and justifies a 
comprehensive legislative approach to protect consumers from surprise medical 
bills based on a modified version of New York’s law. 
Ultimately, this comment recommends the adoption of a statutory 
framework that includes the following provisions: (1) for emergency services, 
ban out-of-network providers from balance billing patients for costs beyond in-
network cost sharing if services are rendered at an in-network facility; (2) for 
non-emergency services, hold patients harmless for out-of-pocket costs beyond 
in-network cost sharing if services are rendered at an in-network facility and 
patients submit an assignment of benefits form; (3) ban anti-assignment clauses 
from health plans in surprise medical billing contexts to ensure that patients can 
assign benefits to providers; (4) count cost sharing for services provided by an 
out-of-network provider towards annual out-of-pocket limits; and (5) establish 
an independent, state-run arbitration process that uses an external standard for 
dispute resolution. This statutory framework is aimed at insulating consumers 
from unfair financial responsibility arising from surprise medical bill situations, 
but should also work in conjunction with recommended disclosure and 
transparency requirements so as to prevent surprise billing situations from 
 
 23. Id. (“Out-of-network providers may, however, also balance bill patients for the difference 
between the providers’ charges and the amount collected from the plan or issuer and from the 
patient in the form of a copayment or coinsurance amount.”). 
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developing as often as possible and to protect informed consumer choice. The 
justification, implementation, and enforcement of the recommended legislation 
is explored. 
Section VI briefly concludes that as narrow network plans proliferate, it is 
more important than ever before for states to enact legislation that protects 
vulnerable consumers from surprise medical bills they could not have avoided. 
Consumers should be removed from the equation in these situations so that the 
balance bill dispute can be left to those who are best equipped to fight it: health 
plans and providers. 
II.  THE PROLIFERATION OF NARROW NETWORK HEALTH PLANS AND THE 
CORRESPONDING INCREASE IN SURPRISE MEDICAL BILLS 
Before discussing how to address the issue of surprise medical bills, it is 
useful to understand why they are becoming so common in the first place. 
Surprise medical bills are increasingly relevant because of the steady rise of 
narrow network insurance plans and the often-corresponding lack of 
transparency regarding which providers are included in the network. Due to the 
unique role that narrow networks play in the insurance market as a means to 
lower premiums and raise quality standards, narrow networks are likely here to 
stay, meaning that the issue of surprise medical bills will remain a concern for 
many individuals. 
A. The Rise of Narrow Networks 
A surprise medical bill fundamentally arises when an out-of-network 
provider provides care to a patient at an in-network facility. This scenario is 
becoming increasingly common as more and more providers are being excluded 
from provider networks due to a rise in narrow network plans. In 2017, nearly 
seventy-five percent of health insurance plans offered through the health 
insurance marketplace in eighteen states will have narrow networks, 
demonstrating an increase from sixty-four percent of plans in 2016 and fifty-one 
percent of plans in 2015.24  Forty-nine percent of Marketplace plans are 
categorized as either narrow or ultra-narrow; specifically, twenty-two percent of 
plans are narrow, meaning that the plans limit their contracting to thirty-one to 
seventy percent of local hospitals, while seventeen percent of plans are ultra-
 
 24. MCKINSEY CTR. FOR U.S. HEALTH SYS. REFORM, 2017 EXCHANGE MARKET: PLAN TYPE 
TRENDS 1 (2016), healthcare.mckinsey.com/sites/default/files/2017-OEP-Plan-Type-Trends-Info 
graphic_VF.pdf. 
For an example of how the public media is portraying this data, see Anna Wilde Mathews, Insurers 
Move to Limit Options in Health-Care Exchange Plans: Losses on Affordable Care Act Exchanges 
Spur Narrower Choice of Doctors, Hospitals, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/insurers-move-to-limit-options-in-health-care-exchange-plans-1472664663 (last visited 
July 23, 2017) (describing narrow network plans as the direct response to “intense pressure to curb 
costs that have led to losses on the Affordable Care Act exchanges”). 
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narrow, meaning that the plans limit their contracting to zero to thirty percent of 
local hospitals.25 Narrow network plans restrict consumer choice of health care 
providers (e.g., physicians, hospitals, out-patient clinics, pharmacies, labs, etc.) 
in exchange for lower monthly premiums.26 The general purpose behind narrow 
network plans is to steer beneficiaries towards lower-cost, higher-quality 
providers.27 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) revitalized the attention on narrow 
networks, but the concept of a limited provider network is far from new. Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), one type of narrow network plan, first 
appeared on the health insurance scene in the 1920s and gained popularity in the 
1970s and 1980s.28 At times, HMOs were criticized by consumers and providers 
who were frustrated with either the lack of choices of health care providers or 
the prospect of lower reimbursement rates.29 However, modern narrow network 
plans are more likely to thrive in terms of longevity and success because they 
are uniquely driven by the demands of individual consumers for lower-cost 
health insurance, as opposed to being purchased nearly exclusively by large or 
governmental employers.30 
Narrow network plans are growing in popularity for two main reasons: (1) 
they lower overall premiums because providers with high reimbursement rates 
are excluded from the network, meaning beneficiaries only receive health care 
services, with the exception of emergency care, from providers that have 
contractually agreed to lower reimbursement rates, and (2) they keep referrals to 
in-network providers who have contractually agreed to certain quality measures 
that contribute to coordinated care for beneficiaries.31 First, the ability to offer 
lower premiums is a valuable tool for attracting potential beneficiaries that are 
shopping for health insurance because price is cited as the most important factor 
in choosing a health plan, even more important than breadth of provider choice 
 
 25. NOAM BAUMAN ET AL., MCKINSEY CTR. FOR U.S. HEALTH SYS. REFORM, HOSPITAL 
NETWORKS: EVOLUTION OF THE CONFIGURATIONS ON THE 2015 EXCHANGES 1–2 (2015), health 
care.mckinsey.com/sites/default/files/2015HospitalNetworks.pdf. 
 26. Thomas H. Lee & Katherine Baicker, Interview: Are High-Deductible Plans vs. Narrow 
Networks Really Our Two Options?, NEW ENG. J. MED. CATALYST (Mar. 17, 2016), catalyst.nejm. 
org/high-deductible-plans-vs-narrow-networks-really-two-options/ (last visited July 25, 2017). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Vernellia R. Randall, Managed Care Utilization Review, and Financial Risk Shifting: 
Compensating Patients for Health Care Cost Containment Injuries, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 
1, 20–21 (1993). 
 29. William Sherman, A News Reporter Explains His “HMO Horror Stories”, MANAGED 
CARE (Sept. 1997), https://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/9709/9709.reporterview.html 
(last visited July 25, 2017). 
 30. Deborah Farringer, Everything Old is New Again: Will Narrow Networks Succeed Where 
HMOs Failed? 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 299, 304–05 (2016). 
 31. JIM WATSON, PBC ADVISORS, BIG CHANGES IN 2016 TO MARKETPLACE PLANS 1 (2016), 
www.pbcgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Big-Changes-in-2016-Marketplace-Plans.pdf. 
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or range of covered services.32 This is significant in projecting the future success 
of narrow network plans considering the competitiveness of narrow network 
prices is increasing while the competitiveness of broad network prices is 
decreasing.33 Narrow network plans are most likely “here to stay.”34 
Narrow provider networks are central to various insurance products. HMOs 
require beneficiaries to select an in-network primary care physician (PCP) who 
serves as a gatekeeper, providing referrals to in-network specialists as needed.35 
HMOs tend to not cover any health care services provided by out-of-network 
providers, with the exception of emergency care, meaning the beneficiary is 
generally responsible for the entire cost unless otherwise specified in the plan.36 
Point of Service (POS) plans also require beneficiaries to select an in-network 
PCP gatekeeper, and beneficiaries pay lower cost sharing for obtaining services 
from in-network providers and pay higher cost sharing for services received 
from out-of-network providers.37 Exclusive Provider Organizations (EPOs) do 
not require specialist referrals from a PCP, but exclusively offer coverage of 
health care services received from an in-network provider like an HMO.38 
Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) also do not require specialist referrals 
from a PCP, but they offer lower cost sharing when services are obtained from 
an in-network provider and higher cost sharing when services are obtained from 
an out-of-network provider, similar to a POS plan.39 Tiered network plans divide 
 
 32. LINDA J. BLUMBERG ET AL., URBAN INST. HEALTH POLICY CTR., HEALTH REFORM 
MONITORING SURVEY: FACTORS INFLUENCING HEALTH PLAN CHOICE AMONG THE 
MARKETPLACE TARGET POPULATION ON THE EVE OF HEALTH REFORM 2 (2013), hrms.urban.org 
/briefs/hrms_decision_factors.html (last visited July 25, 2017). Price has been shown to be the 
dominating decision factor on health plan choice at the state level as well. MARY L. SMILEY, CTR. 
FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & TRANSFORMATION, HEALTH PLAN SELECTION: FACTORS 
INFLUENCING MICHIGANDERS’ CHOICE OF HEALTH INSURANCE 4 (2015), www.chrt.org/docu 
ment/health-plan-selection-factors-influencing-michiganders-choice-of-health-insurance/ (last 
visited August 22, 2017). 
 33. MCKINSEY CTR. FOR U.S. HEALTH SYS. REFORM, supra note 24, at 1. 
 34. Sara Hansard, Higher Cost-Sharing, Narrow Networks, Here to Stay in ACA Health Plans, 
BLOOMBERG BNA HEALTH CARE BLOG (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.bna.com/higher-costsharing-
narrow-b57982059160/ (last visited July 25, 2017); Merrill Goozner, Building Narrow Networks 
that Work, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Dec. 21, 2013), www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20131221/ 
MAGAZINE/312219986 (last visited July 25, 2017). 
 35. U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Health Insurance Plan & Network 
Types: HMOs, PPOs, and More, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.Gov/choose-a-plan/ 
plan-types/ (last visited July 25, 2017). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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in-network providers into various tiers, usually determined by cost or quality.40 
Beneficiaries pay lower cost sharing if they obtain health care services from 
providers in the preferred tier and pay higher cost sharing if they obtain services 
from providers in less-preferred tiers.41 Other plans use a reference pricing 
scheme, where the plan agrees to pay a fixed amount, or “reference price,” for a 
given health care service, and charge the excess bill (if there is any) to the 
beneficiary.42 Therefore, if a beneficiary selects a service or provider whose rate 
exceeds the reference price, the beneficiary is responsible for the whole 
difference between the reference price and that provider’s contracted rate.43 The 
above plans financially incentivize beneficiaries to receive health care services 
from a limited network of providers that are either employed by or contracted 
with the insurer. The narrower a network becomes, the more likely a provider 
who is (even remotely) involved in the medical care of a patient may have an 
out-of-network status. 
B. The Lack of Transparency About Provider Networks 
Plans with narrow networks may lack transparency regarding which 
providers are included in the network, both when purchasing a plan and 
afterwards. There is often a persisting lack of clarity surrounding which 
providers are in the beneficiary’s network and which are not.44 When consumers 
are not adequately informed about which providers are participating in a plan’s 
network, they cannot make informed decisions about their care, such as when 
attempting to schedule a surgical procedure with only in-network providers. 
Nearly seven in ten insured Americans who have unaffordable out-of-network 
medical bills did not know that the health care provider was considered out-of-
network at the time of treatment.45 Especially in narrow or tiered networks, clear 
communication regarding which providers are included in the plan’s network 
 
 40. PAUL FRONSTIN, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., TIERED NETWORKS FOR HOSPITAL 
AND PHYSICIAN HEALTH CARE SERVICES 5 (2003), https://www.ebri.org/publications/ib/index. 
cfm?fa=ibDisp&content_id=179 (last visited July 26, 2017). 
 41. Id. 
 42. PAUL FRONSTIN & M. CHRISTOPHER ROEBUCK, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., 
REFERENCE PRICING FOR HEALTH CARE SERVICES: A NEW TWIST ON THE DEFINED 
CONTRIBUTION CONCEPT IN EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH BENEFITS 5 (2014), https://www.ebri. 
org/pdf/briefspdf/ebri_ib_398_apr14.refprcng.pdf. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Kelly A. Kyanko et al., Out-of-Network Physicians: How Prevalent Are Involuntary Use 
and Cost Transparency?, 48 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1154, 1154 (2013) (reporting that “52 percent[] 
of individuals using out-of-network services experienced at least one contact with an out-of-
network physician where cost was not transparent at the time of care”). 
 45. LIZ HAMEL ET AL., KAISER FAM. FOUND., THE BURDEN OF MEDICAL DEBT: RESULTS 
FROM THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION/NEW YORK TIMES MEDICAL BILLS SURVEY 12 (2016), 
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2016/01/8806-the-burden-of-medical-debt-re 
sults-from-the-kaiser-family-foundation-new-york-times-medical-bills-survey.pdf. 
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may not only be lacking between the insurer and beneficiary but also between 
the insurer and contracted physicians. Often, physicians may participate in an 
insurer’s broader network but are unaware that they are categorized as out-of-
network for patients in specific plans with narrow or tiered networks.46 While 
most plans provide health provider directories, they often contain outdated or 
inaccurate information.47  
This lack of transparency regarding provider network status fundamentally 
undermines the very concept underlying narrow network plans—that consumers 
can benefit from lower cost sharing if they choose providers within the plan’s 
network. For this structure to work, consumers need access to adequate 
information to have an opportunity to make informed choices about providers. 
The lack of transparency surrounding provider network status can lead to 
surprise medical billing situations, where consumers are uninformed about the 
out-of-network status of providers who render health care services. Narrow 
networks are not going anywhere, and it is essential to protect consumers from 
being caught in the middle of billing disputes that lie outside of their control. 
III.  FEDERAL LAW APPROACHES TO PROTECT CONSUMERS FROM SURPRISE 
MEDICAL BILLS THAT ARE ULTIMATELY INADEQUATE 
In an effort to protect consumers from surprise medical billing, CMS and 
NAIC have developed their own approaches to address such scenarios in 
commercial health plans. While well-intended, both of these federal approaches 
ultimately fall short in offering consumer protections from surprise medical 
billing. 
A. CMS’ Final 2017 Benefit and Payment Parameters Rule 
CMS issued the final 2017 Benefit and Payment Parameters Rule (Final 
Rule) for QHPs offered on the ACA Marketplaces, which specifically addresses 
surprise balance billing. For 2018 and later benefit years, “for a network to be 
deemed adequate, each QHP that uses a provider network must . . . count the 
cost sharing paid by an enrollee for an essential health benefit provided by an 
out-of-network ancillary provider in an in-network setting towards the enrollee’s 
annual limitation on cost sharing or provide a written notice” that such charges, 
including balance billing charges, “may not count toward the in-network annual 
 
 46. Jon H. Sutton, Health Care Networks: Surprise Billings for Surgical Patients, BULL. AM. 
C. SURGEONS (July 1, 2016), bulletin.facs.org/2016/07/health-care-networks/ (last visited July 26, 
2017). 
 47. TEX. MED. ASS’N, PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER: NETWORK INADEQUACY AND 
UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION IN INSURANCE 17 (2014) (reporting that “62 percent of physicians had 
detected cases in which they were listed as participating when they were not, and 58 percent of 
physicians had detected cases where they were not listed when they were participating in a plan”). 
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limitation on cost sharing.”48 Alternatively, each QHP with a provider network 
must provide written notice to enrollees at least forty-eight hours before 
rendering a service scheduled at an in-network facility that the enrollee might 
receive a service from an out-of-network ancillary provider and that any 
additional charges may not count toward the in-network cost-sharing limit.49 
Regardless, the statutory definition of cost sharing “does not include . . . balance 
billing amounts for non-network providers.”50  
While it is promising that CMS at least addresses surprise balance billing as 
a matter of network adequacy, the American Hospital Association (AHA) aptly 
points out that because the “regulatory definition of cost sharing excludes 
balance billing, [this provision provides] little financial protection for consumers 
facing unexpected medical bills resulting from out-of-network providers at in-
network facilities.”51 Although some have interpreted this to mean that CMS is 
attempting to include balancing billing in the definition of cost sharing,52 most 
perceive that the referenced cost sharing still does not include balance billing, as 
the statutory definition establishes.53 Thus, CMS’ approach to surprise medical 
bills places the burden entirely on the consumer to simply pay the balance bill, 
and this bill amount does not even go towards the annual limitation on cost 
sharing. This regulation potentially discourages providers from joining health 
plan networks by incentivizing them to perform services at in-network facilities 
and then balance billing patients in order to make more money than the lower 
contract rate earned by in-network providers.54 This is especially tempting 
considering the amount billed for out-of-network care in the emergency room, 
for example, was 798% of Medicare rates, compared to the average in-network 
 
 48. Qualified Health Plan Minimum Certification Standards, 45 C.F.R. § 156.230(e) (2016). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18022(c)(3)(B) (2010). 
 51. American Hospital Association, Comment to the Proposed Rule Regarding HHS Notice 
of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2017 Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(Dec. 18, 2015), www.aha.org/advocacy-issues/letter/2015/151218-cl-cms-9937-p-rin0938-aS 
57.pdf. 
 52. Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Comment to the Proposed Rule 
Regarding HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2018 Under the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.uschamber.com/comment/comment-letter-
hhs-benefit-and-payment-parameters-2018-proposed-rule (last visited July 26, 2017). 
 53. See, e.g., Timothy Jost, The Final 2018 Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters (Part 
2), HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Dec. 18, 2016), healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/12/18/the-final-2018-notice-
of-benefit-and-payment-parameters-part-2/ (last visited July 26, 2017). 
 54. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment 
Parameters for 2017, 81 Fed. Reg. 12,204, 12,305 (Mar. 8, 2016) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 144, 
147, 153, 154 155, 156, & 158) (Several commenters “requested that HHS adopt NAIC Network 
Adequacy Model Act provisions instead. Other commenters were concerned that the proposal may 
have unintended consequences, such as disincentivizing providers from contracting with issuers in 
order to be able to balance bill consumers, or incentivizing consumers and out-of-network providers 
to elect to perform procedures at an in-network facility.”). 
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amount of 297% of Medicare rates for the same service.55 The AHA rightly 
recognizes this unfair burden on consumers who have no control over the out-
of-network care they receive and thus recommends that CMS adopts the NAIC 
Network Adequacy Model Act,56 which offers consumers more financial 
protection from surprise medical bills. While concerns voiced during the notice-
and-comment phase about CMS’ approach did not persuade the agency to 
change its rule, CMS did express its willingness to amend the policy in the future 
to address the surprise medical bill issue after first giving health plans and 
providers an opportunity to work through the issue by themselves.57 
The Final Rule was selected for review because it regulates a significant 
number of commercial health plans available in the private market. CMS has 
taken a more aggressive approach towards limiting surprise medical bills in 
other narrow contexts involving Medicare and Medicaid.58 However, this 
writing is focused on how to best regulate the broad array of commercial 
insurance products, so those CMS regulations are outside the scope of this 
comment.  
B. The NAIC Network Adequacy Model Act 
The NAIC is a regulatory support organization, comprised of and 
administered by chief insurance regulators from all fifty states, the District of 
Columbia, and five U.S. territories, which recommends industry standards based 
on the collective views of domestic and international state insurance 
regulators.59 In November 2015, the NAIC released its Health Benefit Plan 
Network Access and Adequacy Model Act (Model Act), a revised version of its 
1996 Managed Care Plan Network Adequacy Model, in response to the trend 
toward narrow network plans.60 As its name suggests, the Model Act is intended 
to provide states with model legislation to regulate insurance reasonably and to 
 
 55. Cooper & Morton, supra note 10, at 1917. 
 56. American Hospital Association, supra note 51, at 4. 
 57. Bob Herman, Obama Administration Backs Off on ACA Rules for 2017 Health Plans, 
MOD. HEALTHCARE (Feb. 29, 2016), www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160229/NEWS/1602 
29878 (last visited July 27, 2017) (“Our intent in establishing this policy beginning for the 2018 
benefit year is to permit us to monitor ongoing efforts by issuers and providers to address the 
complex issue of surprise out-of-network cost sharing at in-network facilities across all CMS 
programs in a holistic manner, and amend our policy in the future to accommodate progress on this 
issue, if warranted.”). 
 58. Social Security Act § 1902(n)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(n)(3)(B) (2012) (banning 
Medicare providers from balance billing dually eligible individuals enrolled in the Qualified 
Medicare Beneficiary Program). 
 59. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, CTR. FOR INS. POLICY AND RESEARCH, STATE 
INSURANCE REGULATION 2 (2011), www.naic.org/documents/topics_white_paper_hist_ins_ 
reg.pdf. 
 60. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, Network Adequacy, NAIC.ORG (July 14, 2015), 
www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_network_adequacy.htm (last visited July 26, 2017). 
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protect consumers.61 Accordingly, certain provisions of the Model Act provide 
protections against surprise medical bills.62 
In emergency situations, medical bills must include notice that enrollees are 
only responsible for paying “their applicable in-network cost-sharing amount, 
but ha[ve] no legal obligation to pay the remaining balance.”63 However, 
enrollees are required to forward the bill to their health plan “if the difference in 
the billed charge and the plan’s allowable amount is more than [$500.00]” for 
consideration under a mandated “Provider Mediation Process” orchestrated by 
the health plan.64 This provision effectively removes consumers from the 
medical bill dispute, leaving the health plan and out-of-network provider to 
negotiate and agree upon a reasonable rate through the mediation process, 
effectively protecting consumers. 
In non-emergency situations, providers are required to provide enrollees a 
written disclosure stating that services may be rendered by out-of-network 
providers, a range of charges for out-of-network care that enrollees may be 
responsible for covering, and that enrollees can obtain a list of in-network 
providers from their health plans that enrollees may request to participate in their 
care.65 This notice is to be provided both at the time of scheduling or pre-
certification and at the time of admission.66 This approach is focused on 
transparency—making consumers aware that there may be out-of-network costs 
associated with care rendered at an in-network facility. The Model Act 
theoretically affords more control to consumers by providing an opportunity to 
obtain a list of in-network providers from their health plan and to request that 
only those listed providers render care.  
However, this approach works better in theory than in practice, particularly 
with regard to requesting ancillary providers like anesthesiologists, radiologists, 
and pathologists. Such providers are usually assigned to the patient by the health 
care facility or physician group, and while there may be attempts to honor 
requests for a specific anesthesiologist, for example, health care facilities and 
physician groups often disclaim that fulfilling such requests may not be 
possible.67 This places consumers in a difficult situation, forcing them to decide 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN NETWORK ACCESS AND ADEQUACY MODEL ACT § 7(C)(1) 
(NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS 2015), www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-74.pdf [hereinafter MODEL 
ACT]. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. § 7(B). 
 66. Id. § 7(B)(1)–(2). 
 67. See, e.g., HOSP. FOR SPECIAL SURGERY, Anesthesia Frequently Asked Questions, 
https://www.hss.edu/anesthesiology-frequently-asked-questions.asp (last visited July 28, 2017) 
(stating that a patient’s anesthesiologist will be assigned by the hospital on the day before the 
scheduled surgery and that the hospital “cannot promise a specific anesthesiologist . . . prior to 
surgery, [but] do[es] consider patients’ preferences”); SUTTER HEALTH, Hospital Anesthesia 
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whether to reschedule a procedure that they may have had scheduled for months 
or to proceed with the procedure and deal with the out-of-network bill later. 
Consumers may also not know how to navigate the search for a specialist or may 
understandably be more concerned with other aspects of an invasive procedure 
(surgical risks, post-operative rehabilitation, etc.) that do not involve provider 
network status. Additionally, consumers may not know all the types or number 
of providers that might participate in their scheduled procedure. Recall the story 
of Mr. Drier, who was blindsided by a bill from an assistant surgeon who 
unexpectedly participated in his neck surgery.68 Providers may be pulled into 
the operating room at the last minute for a consult or to assist with the procedure 
upon request of the attending physician, without the anesthetized patient 
knowing until a bill arrives weeks later. Therefore, while this provision of the 
Model Act is well intended, it does little to protect consumers who have minimal 
bargaining power in scheduling ancillary providers like anesthesiologists or in 
controlling assistant providers who unexpectedly participate in their care.  
Whenever a balance bill is received, the Model Act gives enrollees the 
option to pay the balance of the bill or “if the difference in the billed charge and 
the plan’s allowable amount is more than [$500.00],” enrollees may send the bill 
to their health plans for processing under a mandated provider mediation 
process.69 The Model Act requires that all health plans establish a provider 
mediation process for cases where out-of-network providers wish to protest the 
benchmark payment rate of the higher of the health plan’s in-network rate or a 
state-determined percentage of the Medicare payment rate in the geographic area 
for the same or similar services.70 Unlike an arbitration process that concludes 
with a binding decision, in a mediation process, the health plan and out-of-
network provider negotiate with the assistance of a neutral third party until both 
sides agree on a reimbursement price.71 While this mediation process, a unique 
proposal compared to CMS’ Final Rule, provides a mechanism to negotiate, out-
of-network providers and health plans are not required to arrive at a mutually 
agreeable reimbursement rate at the end of the process. Furthermore, mediation 
 
Frequently Asked Questions, https://www.sutterhealth.org/hospital-anthesthesia/index.html (last 
visited July 28, 2017) (stating that “while [the hospital] will do [their] best to honor requests [for a 
specific anesthesiologist], this may not be possible”); CORE PHYSICIANS, Anesthesia – Frequently 
Asked Questions, https://www.corephysicians.org/Services/Specialty-Care/Anesthesia/Anesthesia-
Frequently-Asked-Questions (last visited July 28, 2017) (stating that while the physician group 
“do[es their] best to honor these requests [for a specific anesthesiologist] . . . it may not be possible 
due to emergencies or scheduling issues”). 
 68. Rosenthal, supra note 1. 
 69. MODEL ACT § 7(D) (“Limitation on Balance Billing Covered Persons”). 
 70. Id. § 7F–7G(1) (“Provider Mediation Process” and “Benchmark for non-participating 
facility-based provider payments”). 
 71. Id. § 7G(1); JACK HOADLEY ET AL., THE CTR. ON HEALTH INS. REFORMS, GEO. UNIV. 
HEALTH POLICY INST., BALANCE BILLING: HOW ARE STATES PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM 
UNEXPECTED CHARGES? 7 (2015). 
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does not necessarily result in a fair negotiated rate as one party may have greater 
bargaining power. 
The Model Act has the potential to be very influential in the regulation of 
health insurance because CMS and most states tend to at least consider the 
provisions submitted by the NAIC, and the primary role of insurance regulation 
historically falls to the states, as reaffirmed by the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 
1945.72 States that have yet to adopt legislation addressing surprise balance 
billing ought to understand the shortcomings of the Model Act and look to 
approaches other states have implemented, as explored in Section IV, in order 
to determine which statutory framework best protects consumers. 
IV.  A SPECTRUM OF STATE LAW APPROACHES THAT PROTECT CONSUMERS 
FROM SURPRISE MEDICAL BILLS 
Aside from the federal approaches, there are various state approaches to 
limit the surprise medical billing of consumers. State legislation that addresses 
surprise medical billing tends to contain varying combinations of four key 
elements: (1) disclosure and transparency requirements, (2) balance billing 
prohibitions, (3) hold harmless provisions, and (4) creation of adequate provider 
payment schemes.73 This comment focuses on three representative statutes 
selected as examples to demonstrate the general spectrum of state legislative 
frameworks that protect consumers from surprise medical billing, from least 
protective to most protective.  
A. Massachusetts: Hold Harmless Provisions for Emergency and Non-
Emergency Care, Provider-Determined Out-of-Network Reimbursement 
Rates 
For emergency care, Massachusetts’s state preferred provider plan law 
requires that insurers pay out-of-network providers “at the same [benefit] level 
and in the same manner” as if a preferred provider treated the patient if the 
patient could not “reasonably reach a preferred provider.”74 For non-emergency 
but medically necessary covered services rendered at an in-network facility, 
Massachusetts state law requires that insurers cover the cost of such services, 
even if partially performed by an out-of-network provider, with no greater cost 
sharing to the patients where they did not have a “reasonable opportunity to 
choose to have the service performed by [an in-network] provider.”75 Nothing 
 
 72. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2006) (explaining that “[t]he business of insurance, and every person 
engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or 
taxation of such business” and that “[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, 
or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance”). 
 73. HOADLEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 6–7. 
 74. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176I, § 3(b) (2016). 
 75. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176O, § 6(a)(4)(ii) (2016). 
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in this legislative approach prohibits balance billing. Thus, in practice, patients 
still receive balance bills but can usually resolve them by contesting the bill with 
the insurer, usually through an internal appeals process.76 
In theory, this approach shifts the burden to the insurer to indemnify the 
consumer and pay the out-of-network bill. However, in reality, consumers likely 
do not know this is an available option and end up paying the balance bills on 
their own. For the above consumer protection to work as intended, a method of 
notifying consumers of their option to affirmatively contest the bill with their 
insurer would be required. Even if consumers were notified of this option, the 
process of protesting a balance bill through an internal appeals process is 
confusing and burdensome, especially for someone who does not know the 
technicalities of insurance or medical billing.77 This approach also does not 
incentivize communication or cooperation between the insurer, provider, and in-
network facility regarding transparency of network participation. Several 
hospital officials reportedly said that “they have in-network contracts and 
anything beyond that is a matter for insurance companies to handle with 
individual doctors who are not under their control.”78 Thus, health care facilities 
in Massachusetts have taken a hands-off approach instead of recognizing the 
role they could play in provider network formation. 
B. Texas: Hold Harmless Provisions for Emergency Care, Consumer-
Initiated Mediation Process, State-Determined Methodology for Out-of-
Network Reimbursement Rates 
Consumer protections in Texas vary depending on the type of health plan 
held by a consumer. HMOs and EPOs are regulated by hold harmless provisions. 
HMOs are required to “pay for emergency care performed by [out-of-network] 
physicians or providers at the usual and customary rate or at an agreed rate” if 
the care was necessary.79 Similarly, EPOs are required to “fully reimburse a 
nonpreferred provider for . . . emergency care services at the usual and 
customary rate or at a rate agreed to” between the plan and provider if a 
consumer “cannot reasonably reach a preferred provider.”80 This protection 
 
 76. Jack Sullivan, Out-of-Network Billing Surprises: Patients Get Charged for Unexpected 
Services Not Covered by Their Insurance, COMMONWEALTH (Spring 2016), https://common 
wealthmagazine.org/health-care/out-of-network-billing-surprises/ (quoting Matthew Day, senior 
vice president at Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts, “Our policy is to indemnify the member 
from that balance bill”) (last visited July 28, 2017). 
 77. CONSUMER REPORTS NAT’L RESEARCH CTR., supra note 4, at 9 (reporting that thirty-five 
percent of consumers who received surprise medical bills took no action to resolve their billing 
issue, citing reasons such as “I was confused about what to do or found it too complicated” or “I 
didn’t know how to take action/where to complain”). 
 78. Sullivan, supra note 76. 
 79. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1271.155(a) (West 2017). 
 80. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3725(a) (2017). 
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seems to include surprise medical billing scenarios where a patient may not be 
able to reasonably reach an in-network provider due to their emergency 
condition. Like Massachusetts’s approach, here and in other states that instead 
use a state-defined fee schedule to determine provider payment rates, there is no 
ban on balance billing. Therefore, the out-of-network provider can simply send 
bills to consumers for the balance of the out-of-network rate and the “usual and 
customary rate.” Consumers can then contest these bills through their insurers’ 
internal appeals processes. 
On the other hand, PPOs are regulated by transparency requirements and an 
independent mediation process. PPOs are required to provide a current and 
accurate directory of preferred providers online.81 If the directory is found to be 
inaccurate and consumers rely on it, consumers may have the out-of-pocket 
expenses associated with the care counted toward both the in-network deductible 
and out-of-pocket maximum.82 Additionally, consumers may initiate a 
mediation proceeding at no cost if they receive a balance bill for more than $500 
by an “out-of-network hospital-based radiologist, anesthesiologist, pathologist, 
emergency department physician, neonatologist, or assistant surgeon” by 
submitting a “mediation request form.”83 Then, the consumer (optional), health 
plan, and out-of-network provider participate in an informal settlement 
teleconference to attempt to agree on a reasonable rate for the service(s) 
rendered.84  If this does not result in an agreement, the consumer (optional), 
health plan, and out-of-network provider participate in a formal mediation to 
again attempt to agree on a reasonable rate.85 The parties are not required to 
reach an agreement at mediation, which means that the dispute may be referred 
to a special judge for final resolution.86 PPOs must provide notice of the above 
rights to their beneficiaries.87 
The Texas regulation of HMOs and EPOs is concerning for reasons similar 
to the Massachusetts legislation. Consumers may be completely unaware that 
they have the option to contest a balance bill and end up paying the bill. An 
internal appeals process can be very confusing for and burdensome on the 
consumer.88 The regulation of PPOs at least has an additional transparency 
element that informs consumers that they have the option to contest a surprise 
medical bill by requesting a mediation. However, the mediation process places 
the burden on consumers, who must initiate the process if they wish to contest a 
 
 81. Id. § 3.3705(f)(1) (2017). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. §§ 3.3705(f)(1), 21.5010 (2017). 
 84. Id. § 21.5012. 
 85. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1467.054 (West 2017). 
 86. TEX. DEP’T. OF INS., Mediation for Out-of-Network Hospital-Based Health Care Provider 
Claims, www.tdi.texas.gov/consumer/cpmmediation.html (last visited July 28, 2017). 
 87. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3705(f). 
 88. See CONSUMER REPORTS NAT’L RESEARCH CTR., supra note 4, at 9. 
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balance bill. The mediation process, which includes an informal teleconference 
and a formal mediation, is time consuming and intimidating to patients who have 
limited knowledge of insurance and medical billing. Consumers may choose not 
to participate in the teleconference and formal mediation, but then there is a 
concern that the insurer and provider have no incentive to find a fair 
reimbursement rate considering they are only arguing about what the patient will 
pay out of pocket for the out-of-network service rendered. Even after these 
proceedings, there is no requirement that an agreed upon rate is determined, 
yielding a significantly inefficient use of time and resources. Consumers can 
then bring the dispute to court, which will consume even more resources. The 
Texas mediation process at least provides a forum for the out-of-network rate to 
be disputed, but the process is burdensome and does not necessarily yield a result 
in the same way as an alternative dispute resolution process, like arbitration. 
C. New York: Prohibition of Balance Billing, Assignment of Benefits Form, 
Extensive Disclosure and Transparency Requirements, State-Run 
Arbitration Process 
New York led the way in taking the most comprehensive approach to protect 
consumers from surprise medical billing by holding patients harmless for bills 
received for both emergency and non-emergency out-of-network care provided 
at an in-network facility.89  For emergency care, New York state law bans the 
balance billing of patients for costs beyond the in-network cost-sharing amounts 
that apply under their insurance plan.90 For non-emergency care, patients who 
receive a surprise medical bill can submit an “assignment of benefits” form that 
authorizes the provider to bill the insurer directly, and are, accordingly, held 
harmless for any out-of-pocket costs beyond the in-network cost-sharing 
amounts that apply under their plan.91 This approach provides the greatest 
 
 89. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 400.5(h) (2017). 
 90. Id. § 400.5(h) (“A health care plan shall ensure that the insured shall incur no greater out-
of-pocket costs for the services than the insured would have incurred with a participating physician 
or participating health care provider for emergency services . . . .”). 
 91. Id. § 400.6(b) (“If an insured assigns benefits for a surprise bill in writing to a non-
participating physician or non-participating referred health care provider that knows the insured is 
insured under a health care plan, the non-participating physician or non-participating referred health 
care provider shall not bill or seek payment from the insured except for any applicable copayment, 
coinsurance or deductible that would be owed if the insured utilized a participating physician.”); 
id. § 400.5(h)(2) (“A health care plan shall ensure that the insured shall incur no greater out-of-
pocket costs for the services than the insured would have incurred with a participating physician or 
participating health care provider: . . . for a dispute involving a surprise bill when the insured has 
assigned benefits to a non-participating physician or a non-participating referred health care 
provider.”). The “Assignment of Benefits Form” is short and simple for consumers to complete. 
See N.Y. DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., New York State Out-of-Network Surprise Bill Assignment of 
Benefits Form (May 26, 2015), www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/health/OON_assignment_benefits_ 
form.pdf. 
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protection to consumers by completely removing them from surprise billing 
disputes, leaving the provider and insurer to resolve the issue among themselves. 
While New York addresses balance billing in both the emergency and non-
emergency contexts, some states have taken a more limited approach by only 
banning balance billing for emergency services.92 
In addition to the balance billing prohibition and hold harmless provision, 
New York law also has extensive disclosure and transparency requirements for 
(1) insurers, (2) providers, and (3) hospitals. First, under state law, all health 
plans are required to provide a “clear description of the methodology” that the 
insurer uses to calculate out-of-network reimbursement rates, examples of 
estimated out-of-pocket costs for “frequently billed out-of-network health care 
services,” and both written and online information that “reasonably permits” an 
enrollee to estimate their expected out-of-pocket costs for out-of-network care 
in a given location, determined by the difference between the insurer’s 
reimbursement rate and the usual and customary cost for out-of-network care. 93 
Additionally, upon request, every health plan must “disclose the approximate 
dollar amount that the insurer will pay for a specific out-of-network health care 
service.”94  
Second, New York law requires out-of-network providers to give patients 
notice before scheduled non-emergency services that, upon request, they can 
obtain an estimate of anticipated costs for out-of-network services or a fee 
schedule.95 Third, state law mandates that hospitals post information on their 
websites, including a list of plan networks in which the hospital participates; an 
explanation that physician services are not included in hospital charges, and 
therefore physicians may not participate in the same networks; a list of plan 
networks in which the hospital’s employed physicians participate and their 
contact information; and the contact information of physician groups with which 
the hospital has contracted for anesthesiology, pathology, and radiology services 
so that consumers can determine their network status.96 This comprehensive 
approach makes disclosure to the consumer the priority. Although it is 
demanding on health care entities, it at least makes transparency the standard for 
insurers, providers, and health care facilities alike, instead of placing the 
majority of the disclosure burden on one party or another. Other states like 
Connecticut have similar legislation but unlike the New York law, those states 
only require disclosure and transparency from insurers and providers, not health 
care facilities.97 
 
 92. See, e.g., 18-1400-1403 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 1403-11.3.3 (2007) (“Emergency and 
Urgent Care Services”). 
 93. N.Y. INS. LAW § 3217-a(a)(19)–(20) (McKinney 2015). 
 94. Id. § 3217-a(b)(14). 
 95. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 24(2) (McKinney 2015). 
 96. Id. 
 97. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-591b (2012). 
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Banning out-of-network providers from balance billing the patient directly 
raises the previously-discussed concern that such providers may be unfairly 
reimbursed by health insurers for care provided. However, New York law 
addresses this concern by establishing a state-run arbitration process, the 
Independent Dispute Resolution Entity (IDRE), to which a provider can appeal 
to dispute the reasonableness of reimbursement.98 The provider and insurer each 
submit a proposed fee or payment to the IDRE, which makes a binding decision 
by selecting the more reasonable fee.99 If the dispute does not involve a health 
plan, the IDRE determines a reasonable fee on its own.100 In deciding the most 
reasonable price for services rendered in both circumstances, the independent 
arbitrators consider factors such as provider education and experience, case 
circumstances and complexity, individual characteristics of the patient, and 
usual and customary charges.101 Theoretically, this type of “baseball arbitration” 
works by incentivizing both provider and insurer to submit reasonable proposals 
in order to avoid “being stuck with” the opposing party’s proposal.102 Physician 
groups such as the American College of Emergency Physicians support New 
York’s statutory approach of extracting consumers from the billing dispute 
resolution process.103 Although state insurance law is expressly preempted by 
ERISA for self-funded employer plans,104 beneficiaries of such plans and 
uninsured consumers can also appeal to the IDRE in an effort to reduce the 
medical bill balance.105 This is important considering the U.S. Department of 
 
 98. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 400.7(a)(2) (2015) (“Surprise bills: A health care 
plan, a non-participating physician, a non-participating referred health care provider, an insured 
who does not assign benefits, or a patient who is not an insured may submit a dispute regarding a 
surprise bill to the superintendent for review by an IDRE.”). 
 99. Id. § 400.8(h) (“For disputes involving a health care plan, in determining a reasonable fee 
for the services rendered, an IDRE shall select either the health care plan’s payment or the non-
participating physician’s or, as applicable, the non-participating referred health care provider’s 
fee.”). 
 100. Id. (“For disputes that do not involve a health care plan, the IDRE shall determine a 
reasonable fee.”). 
 101. N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW § 604 (2016) (“Criteria for determining a reasonable fee”). 
 102. Mark Scherzer, New York’s New “Surprise Bill” Law Rolls Out New Health Insurance 
Protections for Consumers, FAMILIES USA BLOG (Apr. 10, 2014), familiesusa.org/blog/2014/04/ 
new-york%E2%80%99s-new-surprise-bill-law-rolls-out-new-health-insurance-protections-con 
sumers (last visited July 28, 2017). 
 103. Michelle Andrews, N.Y. Law Offers Model for Helping Consumers Avoid Surprise Out-
of-Network Charges, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 14, 2015), khn.org/news/n-y-law-offers-model-
for-helping-consumers-avoid-surprise-out-of-network-charges/ (last visited July 28, 2017). 
 104. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2012). 
 105. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 400.7(a)(2) (2015). 
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Labor, which regulates self-funded plans, has not enacted any consumer 
protections against surprise medical billing.106  
Compared to a mandated mediation process administered by a health plan 
as recommended by the NAIC Model Act, the statutorily established 
independent arbitration process is more efficient because an impartial arbitrator 
can likely decide the reimbursement rate more quickly and fairly without 
spending weeks in stubborn negotiations. The arbitration process ends with a 
decision that binds both parties, as opposed to mediation that may never result 
in a mutually agreed upon reimbursement rate.107 Additionally, an independent 
arbitrator reduces, or even eliminates, the bargaining power that one party may 
have over the other because the arbitrator has complete discretion to decide a 
reimbursement rate in dispute. Therefore, in surprise medical billing scenarios, 
arbitration is a more effective billing dispute resolution process than mediation. 
Other states have followed in New York’s footsteps by enacting similar 
legislation to protect consumers from surprise medical billing, including 
Florida,108 California,109 and Colorado.110 
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK THAT MAXIMIZES 
CONSUMER PROTECTION 
Consumers should not be caught in the middle of a medical billing dispute 
when they are unaware of or unable to prevent receiving care from out-of-
network providers. The majority of consumers do not understand their legal 
rights or the technicalities of medical billing and insurance regulation, making 
them ill-equipped to navigate their options upon receiving surprise medical 
bills.111 The primary goal of state legislation regarding surprise medical billing 
should be to protect vulnerable consumers by removing them from medical bill 
disputes altogether. Instead, these disputes should be resolved by providers and 
 
 106. CONSUMERS UNION, GETTING STARTED ON SURPRISE MEDICAL BILLS: AN ADVOCATE’S 
GUIDE 4 (2015), consumersunion.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/SurprisebillsAdvocates 
Guide.pdf. 
 107. Id. at 10. 
 108. See FLA. STAT. § 641.3154 (2016) (“Organization liability; provider billing prohibited”). 
 109. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.9 (2016) (legislation banning out-of-network 
providers from billing patients “more than the in-network cost-sharing amount for services” and 
counting this cost sharing toward annual out-of-pocket limits); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 
1371.30 (2016) (legislation setting up an independent dispute resolution process). 
 110. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-16-704 (3)(a)(II) (2016) (legislation holding “consumer[s] 
harmless for additional charges from out-of-network providers for care rendered in [an in-network] 
facility”). 
 111. CONSUMER REPORTS NAT’L RESEARCH CTR., supra note 4, at 12 (reporting that sixty-
seven percent of privately insured Americans did not know the state entity responsible for resolving 
health insurance billing issues, and eighty-seven percent did not know which state governmental 
agency handles complaints about health insurance). 
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insurance companies who are better equipped to reach an agreement due to their 
specialized knowledge of medical billing.  
Accordingly, the best legislative approach to protect consumers and ensure 
fair negotiations between insurance plans and providers is a modified version of 
New York’s comprehensive approach. State legislatures who value consumer 
protection should adopt a statutory framework that includes the following five 
provisions: (1) for emergency services, ban out-of-network providers from 
balance billing patients for costs beyond in-network cost sharing if services are 
rendered at an in-network facility; (2) for non-emergency services, hold patients 
harmless for out-of-pocket costs beyond in-network cost sharing if services are 
rendered at an in-network facility if patients submit an assignment of benefits 
form; (3) ban anti-assignment clauses from health plans in surprise medical 
billing contexts to ensure that patients can assign benefits to providers; (4) count 
cost sharing for services provided by an out-of-network provider towards annual 
out-of-pocket limits; and (5) establish an independent, state-run dispute 
resolution process that uses an external standard and is accessible by health 
plans, out-of-network physicians, and both insured and uninsured patients. 
These provisions best insulate consumers from unfair financial responsibility 
arising from surprise medical billing situations, as explored further below. To 
work in conjunction with the above five provisions, state legislatures should 
additionally adopt disclosure and transparency requirements to prevent surprise 
medical billing situations as often as possible and to protect informed consumer 
choice. 
A. Outline and Justification of the Recommended Legislation 
The five recommended provisions of this proposed comprehensive statute 
realistically acknowledge the context of surprise medical billing and set up an 
effective infrastructure to protect consumers and leave complex billing disputes 
to those best positioned to determine a fair price: insurers and providers. By 
primarily protecting the consumer above all other parties, this approach 
encourages communication and negotiation between insurers, health facilities, 
and providers. 
1. Provision One 
Provision One bans out-of-network providers from balance billing patients 
for costs beyond in-network cost sharing for emergency services rendered at an 
in-network facility. This provision completely removes the patient from the 
medical billing dispute process from the very beginning. In emergency 
situations, this is especially important because patients almost never have 
control over the network status of their treating physicians or ambulance 
providers. Therefore, because of this lack of control, it is not fair to hold patients 
financially responsible for such services. Banning balance billing for emergency 
services eliminates the possibility of consumers simply paying surprise medical 
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bills received in the mail because they are unaware of any alternative option. 
Thus, the approach of this provision requires very little, if any, consumer 
education to be effective.  
It is better to leave medical bill disputes to those who actually have a say in 
the network arrangement, namely providers and health plans. Through banning 
the balance billing of patients for emergency situations, the burden is placed on 
the out-of-network provider and health plan to negotiate a fair price for services 
rendered. If the health plan does not agree with the reasonableness of an out-of-
network provider’s asking price, or if an out-of-network provider does not agree 
with the reasonableness of a health plan’s rate, either party can appeal to the 
independent dispute resolution process set out in Provision Five. The option for 
arbitration keeps the bargaining power between providers and health plans as 
equal as possible. Banning balance billing is the most consumer-protective 
strategy and is appropriate and necessary in emergency situations where 
consumers are most vulnerable. 
2. Provision Two 
Similarly, Provision Two holds patients harmless for out-of-pocket costs 
beyond in-network cost sharing for out-of-network non-emergency services 
rendered at an in-network facility, as long as the patient submits an assignment 
of benefits form. Like the New York law previously discussed, it is 
recommended that states mandate an assignment of benefits form to accompany 
any balance bill sent by an out-of-network provider to a consumer, thereby 
immediately informing the consumer of the option to either pay the bill or fill 
out the simple form to allow the provider to pursue payment. The form places 
the burden on the out-of-network provider and health plan to negotiate a fair 
price for services rendered and keeps the consumer removed from such 
negotiations. Assigning benefits to out-of-network providers makes it easier for 
such providers to collect payments because they are entitled to the benefits by 
law. Creating a legal entitlement to benefits for providers is a useful strategy to 
gain support from physician groups that may be otherwise disapproving of 
legislation that limits the ability of out-of-network physicians to balance bill 
patients. This provision essentially bans balance billing patients when an 
assignment of benefits is in place, protecting the consumer in a similar manner 
as Provision One, with an added attraction for out-of-network physicians 
through the legal entitlement to plan benefits. 
3. Provision Three 
Provision Three bans anti-assignment clauses from health plans in surprise 
medical billing contexts to ensure that patients can assign benefits to providers, 
who can accordingly negotiate a reimbursement rate with the health plan 
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directly.112 This provision prevents health plans from strategically getting 
around the hold harmless protection of Provision Two by simply adding an anti-
assignment clause to their contracts with consumers. Having a ban on anti-
assignment clauses is vital because consumers may not understand the 
implications of all the terms in insurance contracts. Additionally, consumers 
virtually never have the option to negotiate an anti-assignment clause because 
insurance contracts are typically contracts of adhesion where each consumer has 
limited bargaining power compared to the insurance company.113 Accordingly, 
the legislative framework needs to include a ban on anti-assignment clauses in 
health insurance contracts to protect the consumer-protecting intention behind 
Provision Two. 
4. Provision Four 
In the event that a consumer chooses to pay for non-emergency services 
rendered by an out-of-network provider instead of assigning benefits to that 
provider, Provision Four counts the payment towards annual out-of-pocket 
limits. This provision is aimed at preventing consumers from being 
overburdened by medical bills with high out-of-network service charges should 
they choose to pay the bills. This provision would not apply to all balance billing 
but only to surprise medical billing circumstances—where a patient is 
unexpectedly billed for out-of-network services rendered at an in-network 
facility—so as to prevent very sick patients from strategically reaching their out-
of-pocket limits quickly in order to have their health plans cover all remaining 
costs. 
5. Provision Five 
Provision Five establishes an independent, state-run arbitration process 
where health plans, out-of-network physicians, and patients can dispute 
reimbursement rates for out-of-network services rendered. This dispute 
resolution process is a better alternative to the NAIC Model Act’s and Texas’s 
mediation processes because it concludes with a final, binding decision made by 
an impartial arbitrator. Although arbitration tends to be more formal and 
expensive than mediation,114 arbitration is a better option in surprise medical 
 
 112. Modeled after Colorado law that requires insurers to permit the assigning of benefits to 
out-of-network providers. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-16-106.7 (2016) (providing that “[a]ny carrier 
that provides health coverage to a covered person shall allow, but not require, such covered person 
under the policy to assign, in writing, payments due under the policy to a licensed hospital, other 
licensed health care provider, an occupational therapist . . . , or a massage therapist”). 
 113. See Clark C. Havighurst, Prospective Self-Denial: Can Consumers Contract Today to 
Accept Health Care Rationing Tomorrow?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1755, 1766 (1992). 
 114. See Jeanne M. Brett et al., The Effectiveness of Mediation: An Independent Analysis of 
Cases Handled by Four Major Service Providers, 12 NEGOTIATION J. 259, 259 (1996) (reviewing 
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billing scenarios because the end result is always a binding reimbursement rate, 
as opposed to an optional agreement subject to administrative appeal and then 
judicial appeal. 
To address concerns regarding New York’s baseball arbitration process, the 
recommended process would instead use an external standard, such as a 
percentage above Medicare rates (e.g., 150% the Medicare rate for a given 
service), as the baseline rate. The health plan and out-of-network provider could 
present evidence to the arbitrator explaining why the rate should be adjusted up 
or down due to various factors, like those considered by New York arbitrators, 
such as provider education and experience, case circumstances and complexity, 
individual characteristics of the patient, and usual and customary charges. This 
external standard would help to provide an environment to establish a truly fair 
payment that will likely be set somewhere between the health plan’s offer price 
and the out-of-network provider’s asking price. Thus, compromise in rate 
negotiation would be consistently established instead of one side necessarily 
“winning” and the other “losing” as in New York’s baseball arbitration process. 
Health plans and providers alike will probably favor this method, especially after 
giving input as to what the external baseline rate should be, because it simplifies 
the negotiation process and ends in compromise instead of a one-sided outcome. 
6. Recommended Disclosure and Transparency Requirements 
In addition to the above framework, states should adopt legislation that 
increases disclosure and transparency to prevent surprise medical bill 
circumstances from arising in the first place when at all possible. As discussed 
previously, New York’s disclosure and transparency framework is ideal because 
it sets standards for all those involved in health care delivery: insurers, providers, 
and health care facilities. Like the New York framework, health plans should be 
required to keep a current and accurate provider directory available online with 
a user-friendly interface, to provide a clear explanation of how out-of-network 
reimbursement rates are calculated, examples of anticipated out-of-pocket costs 
for out-of-network services that are often billed, and a written and online method 
where consumers can estimate their expected out-of-pocket costs for out-of-
network care in a given location. 
Furthermore, every health plan should be mandated to disclose the specific 
cost of an out-of-network service that the insurer will pay upon request. Out-of-
network providers should also be required to give patients notice before a 
scheduled non-emergency service that, upon request, they can obtain an estimate 
of anticipated costs for out-of-network services or a fee schedule. Further, 
hospitals should be required to post the following information on their websites: 
(1) a list of plan networks in which the hospital participates, (2) an explanation 
 
449 mediation cases and finding that mediation costs “far less than arbitration, took less time, and 
was judged a more satisfactory process than arbitration”). 
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that physician services are not included in hospital charges and therefore 
physicians may not participate in the same networks, (3) a list of plan networks 
in which the hospital’s employed physicians participate and their contact 
information, and (4) contact information of physician groups that the hospital 
has contracted with for emergency medicine, anesthesiology, pathology, 
radiology services, and other independent contractors so that consumers can 
determine their network status. This comprehensive approach to disclosure 
makes the consumer the priority and holds insurers, providers, and hospitals 
alike to a high standard of transparency. 
The higher standard of transparency might encourage health care facilities 
to adopt internal corporate policies that require all providers, as a condition of 
practicing there, to participate in the same health plan networks in which the 
facility participates. Several facilities, such as Boca Raton Regional Hospital in 
South Florida and Jewish Hospital in Louisville, Kentucky, have taken this 
approach with a policy that requires its contracting anesthesiologists, emergency 
physicians, pathologists, and radiologists to contract with the health plans in 
which the hospital participates.115 As a result of such a policy, the facilities have 
processed fewer complaints regarding surprise medical billing, which is to be 
expected because nearly all providers at the in-network facility now also have 
in-network status.116 This incentive is perhaps the most straightforward strategy 
to eliminate scenarios in which surprise medical billing might occur, but it is 
challenging to get providers and health plans to reach an agreement about rates 
for services rendered. The AMA vehemently opposes the concept of facilities 
forcing out-of-network providers to enter negotiations with health plans, 
viewing this policy as “a methodology to coerce physicians through yet another 
way to not receive sufficient payment.”117 However, if such a policy becomes 
commonplace among health care facilities, negotiated rates between out-of-
network providers and health plans may be more likely to reach a fair and 
reasonable price. Having the industry voluntarily come to this consensus in 
response to the transparency standards would likely receive more support than 
mandating the above policy, such as by making it a Medicare condition of 
participation, although this is another potential option. 
It remains important to recognize that disclosure and transparency cannot 
always prevent surprise medical bill situations. Many consumers who fall victim 
to surprise medical billing were in an emergency condition or anesthetized at the 
time of service when an out-of-network provider unexpectedly participated in 
their care. Therefore, while these disclosure and transparency measures are 
essential to protect informed consumer choice, they cannot wholly eliminate 
surprise medical billing. Thus, the proposed framework is necessary to work in 
 
 115. Herman, supra note 17. 
 116. See id. 
 117. Meyer, supra note 21. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
206 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 11:179 
conjunction with disclosure and transparency measures to best protect 
consumers. 
B. Implementation and Enforcement of the Recommended Legislation 
To ensure successful enactment and implementation, states must first 
consider the political feasibility of the above comprehensive surprise medical 
bill legislation. In general, supporters of a comprehensive approach include 
consumer groups118 and state health plan associations.119 State medical 
associations have been inconsistent in terms of their support for such an 
approach.120 Ancillary providers who are often out-of-network providers in 
billing situations, such as anesthesiologists and radiologists, tend to disapprove 
of the comprehensive approach.121 States must be prepared to navigate their 
particular stakeholders and to strategically emphasize the ultimate goal of this 
legislation: to protect consumers by removing them entirely from medical bill 
disputes, leaving only those best equipped to negotiate about rates (providers 
and health plans) at the table.  
After the legislation is enacted, it is essential to inform consumers about 
their new options when they receive a surprise medical bill. Thus, as in New 
York’s legislation, both health plans and providers will be required to disclose 
to consumers that they are not financially responsible for any amount above that 
 
 118. See Harris Meyer, Florida Governor Signs Law Shielding Patients from Surprise Medical 
Bills, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Apr. 14, 2016), www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160414/NEWS 
/160419946 (last visited July 28, 2017); FLA. HOUSE OF REPS. STAFF ANALYSIS, CS/CS/HB 221 
OUT-OF-NETWORK HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE, at 4 (2016), www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill 
/2016/221/Analyses/h0221c.APC.PDF (outlining the Florida Insurance Consumer Advocate’s 
recommendations for legislation that would “[h]old consumers harmless (prohibit ‘balance billing’) 
in emergency and ‘surprise billing’ situations[,] [e]stablish an alternative dispute resolution process 
to allow nonparticipating providers to challenge the amount of payment received from an insurer[,] 
. . . [r]equire insurers to update their provider directories on a timely basis[, and] [r]equire hospitals 
to make data available regarding hospital-based providers who are not in the network”). 
 119. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 118 (reporting that the CEO of the Florida Association of 
Health Plans declared, “This is the most comprehensive consumer protection legislation in the 
country on (this issue), and our association is proud to support it . . . . The stakeholders came 
together and agreed to remove patients from the middle of disputes between insurers and 
providers.”). 
 120. Id. (reporting that while the Florida Medical Association supported Florida’s 
comprehensive consumer protection legislation, the California Medical Association strongly 
opposed its similar law, “arguing that it would hinder consumers’ ability to use their plans’ out-of-
network benefits and give plans too much negotiating leverage over physicians”). 
 121. Id. (reporting that anesthesiology and radiology groups strongly opposed Florida’s 
comprehensive law); see also Harris Meyer, Passage of California Surprise-Bill Legislation Could 
Spur Other States to Act, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Sept. 1, 2016), www.modernhealthcare.com/article/ 
20160901/NEWS/160909980 (last visited July 28, 2017) (reporting that physician groups 
representing plastic surgeons, cardiologists, and anesthesiologists were strongly against 
California’s comprehensive law). 
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which they would normally pay if they had received care from an in-network 
provider, along with information about the assignment of benefits form, the 
independent dispute resolution process, and where to file a complaint through 
the state. The simplest way to start enforcing the legislation is through 
monitoring consumer and provider complaint data collected through the state. 
Enforcement of the recommended legislation would involve a collaboration of 
agencies, such as the state insurance department that has jurisdiction over health 
plans and the state medical board that has jurisdiction over licensed providers. 
These agencies would jointly investigate illegal balance billing by either health 
plans or medical providers. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Now is the time for state legislatures to act. As narrow provider networks 
continue to thrive as a premium-lowering mechanism, it is more important than 
ever to protect vulnerable consumers from surprise medical billing by enacting 
comprehensive legislation as recommended above. Consumers should not be 
stuck with outrageous balance bills in circumstances where they have no control 
over which providers participate in their care, despite playing by the rules and 
attempting to utilize only the services of in-network providers. Therefore, states 
should adopt the recommended statutory framework, based on a modified 
version of New York’s comprehensive law, because it both insulates consumers 
from unfair financial responsibility and promotes informed consumer choice, 
which can prevent surprise medical bills from arising, through transparency and 
disclosure. It is time to aggressively address surprise medical bill sticker shock 
once and for all. 
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